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The voting system in the Council of the Union 
 
From the very beginnings of the European Community – later the European Union - the 
Council, which is the body in which Member States are represented, has operated under 
a system of weighted voting. The system takes account of the considerable population 
differences between Member States, although it lessens the impact of this population 
factor by also taking into consideration the principle of equality among the Member States. 
Thus, a mechanism ‘rewards’ the countries with the smallest populations, ensuring a 
reasonably balanced relationship between the different States. By way of example, prior 
to the Nice reform of December 2000, Luxembourg, with a population of approximately 
350,000, had 2 votes in Council, the Netherlands (population approximately 15 million) 
had 5 votes, and Germany (82 million inhabitants then) had 10 votes. 
 
As the EU has grown and new States have joined - for the most part small and medium-
sized countries in terms of population - the original weighting of votes has had to be 
revisited, on account of the fact that the increase in the number of small States, when 
combined with the aforementioned ‘reward’, has resulted in a progressively unbalanced 
system, whereby a significant number of States representing a small percentage of the 
EU’s population held a disproportionate amount of power within the Council.  
 
Following several attempts to reform the voting system and with a view to the forthcoming 
enlargement of the EU to incorporate countries of central and eastern Europe, agreement 
was finally reached in Nice in December 2000 on a re-weighting of votes, in order to 
reduce the reward given to the smallest countries and introduce a new balance between 
the different States (Luxembourg was given 4 votes, the Netherlands 13 and Germany 
29).  
 
The Treaty of Nice came into force on 1 February 2003 and the new weighting of votes 
will apply as of 1 November 2004. 
 
Spain and the voting system 
On joining the European Union, Spain was accorded medium/large country status and 
received eight votes in Council under the weighted voting system (as against the 
Netherlands’ 5 votes and Germany’s 10), two Commissioners (the same as Germany, 
France, Italy and the United Kingdom; the other Member States could only appoint one 
Commissioner) and 64 seats in the European Parliament (compared to the Netherlands’ 
31 and Germany’s 87 prior to reunification, increased to 99 thereafter). In the 
Commission, therefore, Spain was treated on a par with the “big” members.  
At the Amsterdam IGC, the reform of the voting system was examined in the framework of 
an overall institutional package, under which seats in the European Parliament were 
redistributed to make room for the new Member States and members with 2 
Commissioners were asked to relinquish one of the two. It was within this framework that 
consideration was given to the possibility of replacing the system of weighted voting for a 
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double-majority system, taking into account Member States and their populations.  France 
opposed all forms of double majority at the time, citing vital interests, namely, the loss of 
institutional parity with Germany in Council if the new voting system were adopted. In view 
of the failure to reach agreement, negotiations on the reform of the institutions were put 
back, as set out in the Protocol on institutions annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam. Spain 
secured a formula that formally acknowledged the country’s special situation in the 
institutions, i.e. as an medium/large country for whom giving up the second Commissioner 
represented a proportionally greater loss than was the case for other countries. This 
formula was set out in Declaration 50, which was annexed to the aforementioned Protocol 
on the institutions and specified that a solution to the “special case of Spain” would have 
to be found. 
  
At the IGC in Nice, where France again firmly opposed the double majority formula, Spain 
and some other large countries accepted the reduction from two Commissioners to one. 
Moreover, Spain had to accept a proportionally greater sacrifice than other States in the 
case of the reduction in the number of seats in Parliament, from 64 to 54 in EU-25 and to 
50 in EU-27. In return, its weight in Council was increased to 27 votes, the largest nations 
receiving 29 (compared to the former system of 8 vs. 10). This outcome was a direct 
result of Spain’s coherent defence of her positions in the previous negotiations, 
particularly the aforementioned Amsterdam Declaration.  
 
Voting as envisaged by the draft constitutional Treaty drawn up by the Convention. 
Overview of the background to the new reform 
The draft Treaty proposes that qualified majority in the Council be defined as ‘half plus 
one’ of the Member States, provided that they represent at least 60% (3/5) of the 
population. 
  
The draft thus seeks to reopen the debate that had already been settled on this very issue 
at Nice, after difficult discussions and within the framework of a global “institutional 
package” covering voting in Council, the distribution of seats in the European Parliament 
and the make-up of the Commission. 
 
In assessing the merits of this proposal, it should be recalled that at the Nice European 
Council it was stated that “the new [Nice] Treaty reinforces the legitimacy, the efficiency 
and the public acceptability of the institutions and allows for reaffirmation of the strong 
commitment to the EU with the process of enlargement”, and that “the European Council 
considers that after the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice the EU will be able to 
welcome new Member States”. In the same vein, the Declaration on the future of the EU, 
an appendix to the Final Act of the Conference, stresses that “with the ratification of the 
Treaty of Nice the European Union will have completed the necessary institutional 
changes for the accession of new Member States”.  It is also worth recalling that there is 
no basis in the Laeken Declaration of December 2001, which convened the European 
Convention, to warrant revisiting the institutional agreements reached at Nice. Lastly, one 
should not overlook the fact that said arrangements were ratified by all Member States, 
including the accession countries, as recently as 16 April, on the occasion of the signing 
of the Accession Treaty in Athens.  
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It should be noted also that, following the debates in the Convention, the draft of the new 
Treaty maintains the distribution of seats in the European Parliament agreed in Nice 
(modification is provided for as of 2009, but only if agreed unanimously) and ultimately 
applies the Nice provisions on the reform of the Commission (with the introduction of a 
smaller College of Commissioners as of 2009). The President of the Convention, despite 
his initial reluctance, was forced to make these “concessions to Nice” in order to isolate 
Spain’s position in the Convention Presidium and thus secure backing for the proposed 
reform of the voting system.  
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This creates, at least in Spain’s opinion, a system that is unbalanced on three counts.  On 
the institutional level, because a system of weighted representation is opted for in the 
case of the European Parliament, the population criterion being applied degressively in 
order to benefit the smallest countries.  In the Council, where weighted voting has been in 
operation since 1957, the proposal is to apply a principle of representation proportional to 
population (partly qualified by the rule that a majority of Member States is also required to 
adopt a decision - a rule which, incidentally, was already provided for in Nice). The system 
is also unbalanced as regards the relations between Member States, given that, on the 
pretext of improving the efficiency of the decision-making system, in fact a redistribution of 
power between the Member States is introduced that clearly works to the benefit of the 
most populous countries, but without making any visible improvement to the efficiency of 
the decision-making process. The proposed system disadvantages Spain in particular, as 
it addresses just one of the three components of the institutional equation, specifically the 
area in which Spain was compensated in Nice in return for agreeing to cede on the other 
two.  
 
The vote in the draft constitutional Treaty drawn up by the Convention.  
Considerations on the proposal 
For Spain the change from the voting system agreed on in Nice to the one proposed by 
the draft of the new Treaty is extremely negative. Although in absolute terms it could be 
argued that it results in an increase in Spain’s weight in the Council (under Nice, Spain’s 
27 votes of a total of 321 in an EU-25 equates to 8.41%; under the proposal in the new 
Treaty, 40 million Spaniards out of a total of 450 million people in EU-25 equals 8.88%) 
the fact of the matter is that Spain’s relative weight, i.e. the power to influence decisions in 
Council is severely and adversely modified.  
 
By way of illustration, under the Nice system, in a 25-member EU - the system that enters 
force as of 1 November next year-, a qualified majority is reached with 232 votes in the 
Council out of a total of 321. Consequently, 90 votes are required to condition 
negotiations through what is known as a blocking minority. The combined votes of Spain 
and Poland add up to 54, and hence only three small-medium countries, such as 
Portugal, Hungary and Greece (with 12 votes each), would be needed also to form a 
blocking minority. 
 
Under the proposal set out in the new Treaty, Member States wanting to block a specific 
measure would need to represent 40% of the EU population, i.e. around 180 million out of 
a total of 450. This means that, to go back to the example given above, Spain and Poland, 
which together have 80 million, would need, on the basis of the populations of the current 
EU-25, the backing of almost ALL, LITERALLY, almost ALL, the other Member States of 
the EU, apart from the Big Four, to block a proposal. Hence Spain and Poland would have 
to enlist the support of another eleven “partners” to secure a blocking minority, but based 
not on the population criterion, rather on the number of Member States.  
 
The situation would be essentially the same in an EU of 27 members (including Romania 
and Bulgaria). 
 
Put another way, the double-majority system proposed for the new Treaty theoretically 
places the EU in the hands of the big six, including Spain and Poland. However, in view of 
the considerable differences in population between Spain/Poland and the other large 
countries, in practice the four biggest countries will control matters and Spain and 
Poland’s possibilities will be greatly reduced when it comes to finding potential allies. 
Without the support of at least one large country (or even two, if Germany were not one of 
them) it would be almost impossible for Spain to block a decision which was detrimental to 
our interests.  
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Arguments in defence of the voting system agreed in Nice 
The Spanish Government’s position is grounded on solid arguments. 
 
a) The Convention, in our opinion, lacked both legitimacy and a mandate to reopen the 
Nice institutional agreements.  
 
It lacked legitimacy because the Convention was convened by the Declaration on the 
future of the EU adopted by the Nice Intergovernmental Conference of 2000, where the 
conditions for a debate on the required reforms were established, but it was previously 
stated that “with the ratification of the Treaty of Nice the European Union will have 
completed the necessary institutional changes for the accession of the new Member 
States”.  
 
Neither was it mandated to revisit Nice because there is no such mention in the Laeken 
Declaration of December 2001 formally establishing the European Convention. 
 
b)We believe also that the general interests of the EU are at stake. With the double-
majority system proposed the EU would, in practice, end up being governed by the four 
most populous Member States. 
 
c) We consider the institutional proposal tabled for discussion at the IGC to be seriously 
unbalanced: it applies a weighted (population) criterion for the distribution of seats in the 
European Parliament, the body most representative of Europe’s citizens - who by 
definition are all equal-, and a purely proportional criterion in setting the weight of each 
State in Council, the body where the demographic factor ought to be off-set in some 
manner by the principle of equality among the member States.  
 
This is why a majority of Member States believe that the voting system agreed upon at 
Nice, whilst not perfect, does nonetheless reflect best an adequate compromise between 
the interests of the different Member States. 
  
d)In our opinion, the argument repeatedly raised by advocates of the Convention 
proposal, namely, that the double-majority system is best because it is easier for the man 
in the street to understand, is absurd and fallacious. Under that same argument, there 
would be grounds for enforcement “an eye for an eye” approach instead of contemporary 
Penal Codes.  
 
It is worth noting also that the Nice voting system appears more complicated on paper 
than is in fact the case. Two requirements must be met in order to obtain a qualified 
majority: a given number of votes (232/321 in a 25-member EU or 255/345 in a 27-
member EU) and the support of at least half the Member States, although a country can 
request that it be verified whether said States represent at least 62% of the population of 
the EU (a condition introduced at Germany’s request). In practice, however, the system is 
much more straightforward: the number of States and percentage of population criteria 
are not met in a mere 0.00085% of the cases where the required number of votes is 
obtained.  
 
In short, assuming, as some appear to do, that European citizens are not very conversant 
with mathematics, it would seem easier and more transparent to add together States and 
votes, in a calculation that involves three-digit figures, than to add together States and 
populations, which would entail much larger figures.  
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e)We believe, moreover, that the double-majority system could, in practice, be even more 
difficult to implement than weighted voting. Once the details are finalised, the weighted 
voting method applies automatically, until such times as further new members join the EU 
Área: Europe - ARI Nº 125/2003 
Fecha 10/30/2003 
 
(but this, in any case, would not alter the bases of the system). Conversely, the double-
majority system would require complex negotiation to determine what is meant by the 
‘population’ of a Member State and equally complex negotiation to establish the 
mechanisms for adjusting population figures to take account of demographic changes in 
each Member State. 
 
In this regard, it is argued at times that one of the advantages of the proposed system is 
that it too would apply automatically, thus avoiding the need for protracted negotiations on 
the allocation of votes to new members with each new accession. Here again, it is a 
simplistic argument that seeks to replace politics with mathematics and overlooks that 
negotiations will still be needed on other issues, including institutional ones, - for example, 
seats in Parliament, where once again proportional representation reasoning is not 
applied. One could even say that, by advocating application of the population criterion, we 
would be bringing forward the debate on future accessions: acceptance of this criterion 
could be tantamount to questioning the future accession of States whose current or 
potential population could fundamentally alter the balance of power between the Member 
States (i.e. Turkey) 
  
f)As far as the allegedly more efficient decision-making brought about by the system 
proposed by the Convention is concerned, the following observations are relevant: 
 
-It is possible, as indeed some have argued, that of the 2.7 million voting combinations in 
the Nice system in a 27-member EU, only 2.1% meet the conditions necessary to obtain a 
qualified majority.  
 
But care must be taken with the fallacies lurking behind these impressive numbers. The 
percentage of failed combinations is so high precisely because the system distributes 
power generously among Member States, giving extra weight to the least populous, and 
many Member States are small or medium-sized in terms of population. Moreover, 2.1% 
of 2.7 million is, may well be a small figure from the mathematical standpoint, but it 
translates to 56,700 combinations of successful votes, which is a very high number from 
the political standpoint.  
 
-The voting system proposed by the Convention means that 21.9% of the possible voting 
combinations reach a qualified majority.  
 
But this alone is not proof that the system is more efficient, given that it soon becomes 
apparent that the basis for this supposed increased efficiency is rooted simply in the 
concentration of real decision-making power in fewer hands, basically the four largest 
Member States. To stretch the argument further, mathematically speaking, the most 
efficient decision-making system in a given group is one that places all the power in the 
hands of one individual: 100% efficiency.  
 
Moreover, it is somewhat surprising that those in favour of reforming the Nice voting 
system claim that the system proposed by the Convention is more democratic. This 
argument can only mean that, in their opinion, truly democratic representation is only that 
based on a purely proportional system - which incidentally is not used in Member States, 
particularly those with Upper House representing federal States. The reverse argument 
would be that those who use corrective devices to facilitate representation of minority or 
weaker positions are not democratic. That is a political nonsense, which flies in the face of 
all modern developments in constitutional theory on democratic systems. 
 
Final remarks  
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Certain European leaders have recently criticised Spain (and Poland) over the voting 
system controversy, accusing them of seeking to stall the Conference and veto the 
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adoption of the new constitutional EU Treaty. Perhaps the “burden of proof” should be 
reversed and Member States who ardently defend, even with threats, the voting system 
proposed by the Convention should be asked whether they would be prepared to block 
the new Treaty on the mere grounds that it did not reform the voting system agreed at 
Nice. 
